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Abstract. Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (DSSE) allows
a client not only to search over ciphertexts as the traditional searchable symmetric encryption does, but also to update these ciphertexts
according to requirements, e.g., adding or deleting some ciphertexts. It
has been recognized as a fundamental and promising method to build
secure cloud storage. In this paper, we propose a new DSSE scheme
to overcome the drawbacks of previous schemes in the state-of-art. The
biggest challenge is to realize the physical deletion of ciphertexts with
small leakage. We employ both logical and physical deletions, and run
physical deletion in due course to avoid extra information leakage. Our
instantiation achieves noticeable improvements throughout all following
aspects: search performance, storage cost, functionality, and information
leakage when operating its functions. We also demonstrate its provable
security under adaptive attacks and practical performance according to
experimental results.

1

Introduction

Symmetric-key encryption with keyword search (or searchable symmetric encryption, SSE for short) allows clients to upload their keyword searchable ciphertexts to a server, and then delegate keyword search to the server and retrieve files of an expected keyword. A secure SSE scheme can keep the privacy of
keywords not only to outside attackers but also to the server. The details are as
follows: for all keywords of a file, a client respectively generates the corresponding
keyword searchable ciphertexts and the encrypted file in symmetric-key setting,
and stores these ciphertexts in the server; to retrieve the files of an expected
keyword, the client delegates a keyword search token to the server, and then
the server finds out all matching keyword searchable ciphertexts, decrypts out
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their encrypted file identifiers, and returns the corresponding encrypted files of
these identifiers to the client; finally, the client decrypts out these files. Since the
encryption of files can be separately processed with an independent symmetrickey encryption scheme, SSE only focus on the generation of keyword searchable
ciphertexts. Hence, unless the clear statement, all encryptions or ciphertexts are
searchable in this paper.
In the past decade, most of researches on SSE focus on improving security,
accelerating search performance or searching with multiple keywords. Until 2012,
Kamara et al. [1] first proposed a dynamic SSE (DSSE) scheme (called KPR’12
in our paper) by constructing hidden chains to connect all searchable ciphertexts
of the same keyword. With a keyword search trapdoor, these hidden chains will
be partially disclosed and guide the server to efficiently find out all matching
ciphertexts. In addition, KPR’12 can add new ciphertexts to their corresponding
chains or delete old ciphertexts from these chains. Clearly, DSSE is more flexible
than the traditional SSE both in theory and practice.
But The KPR’12 scheme causes significant information leakage in updating
ciphertexts. Specifically, when adding or deleting ciphertexts, it will leak some
information of the corresponding chains, e.g., the number of ciphertexts in a
chain. These leakage information makes the server having a noticeable advantage
to guess keywords. In 2013, Kamara et al. [2] modified their previous work by
sharply increasing the size of searchable ciphertexts. Technically, this new DSSE
scheme (called KP’13 in our paper) generates secure vectors for all keywords,
where each vector is of size linear with the number of all files, and then constructs
a tree structure for these vectors to accelerate search performance. Since each
keyword is contained only by a part of files in practice, these vectors contain
many redundancies. Hence, KP’13 takes a high storage complexity.
In 2014, Cash et al. [3] proposed a DSSE scheme (called CJJ’14) by applying private counters to constructing hidden relationships among all keyword
searchable ciphertexts. Technically, each keyword has a private counter which is
initiated as “1”; to generate a searchable ciphertext of a keyword, the current
value of the corresponding counter will be taken as input, and after the generation, the counter will be added with “1”; when receiving a keyword search
trapdoor, the server can efficiently find out all matching ciphertexts by traversing all possible values of a counter. CJJ’14 is more convenient than KPR’12 and
KP’13. But it cannot physically delete ciphertexts. In other words, only logical
deletion is achieved by taking extra storage to remember the deleted ciphertexts. When searching a keyword, the deleted ciphertexts will not be taken into
account even if they contain the keyword. Hence, its storage complexity will consistently increase with the total number of both adding or deleting operations.
This disadvantage also appears in the work of [4].
Rough comparisons of the above DSSE schemes are listed in Table 1 (the
exact comparisons will be given in Section 7). The summary is that no previous
work is good at all aspects of search complexity, storage complexity, functionality
and information leakage. Hence, we are interested in proposing a new DSSE
scheme to complete this work in the state-of-art.

3

Table 1: Rough comparisons. Search is to find out the files containing a queried
keyword. AddFile is to add all keyword searchable ciphertexts of a new file.
AddKeyword is to add a new keyword searchable ciphertext of an existing file.
DeleteFile is to delete all keyword searchable ciphertexts of an existing file.
DeleteKeyword is to delete a keyword searchable ciphertext of an existing
file. Information leakage denotes the information leaked by running previous
functions.
Search
Storage
Functions
Information
Complexity Complexity AddFile AddKeyword DeleteFile DeleteKeyword Leakage
KPR’12[1]
Low
Normal Achieved
Failed
Physical
Failed
Large
KP’13[2]
Normal
High
Achieved
Failed
Physical
Failed
Normal
CJJ’14[3]
Low
Low
Achieved
Achieved
Failed
Logical
Small
Ours
Low
Low
Achieved
Achieved
Physical
Physical
Small
Scheme

1.1

Our Main Ideas

Before introducing our main ideas, some basic concepts are needed. In the
paradigmatic application of DSSE, each file has an unique identifier and several keywords. It is common to let file-keyword pair (id, w) denote that the file
with identifier id has keyword w. And suppose database DB consists of all such
pairs, which are derived from the application.
Initial Phase
Initial Phase

After Deleting The
K3 Ciphertext

K

Before Searching Keyword w
L2w 1|| id2 || Pw2

Pw1

L3w 0|| id3 || Pw3

After Searching Keyword w
Pw1

×

L2w 1|| id2 || Pw2

×

Lw 0|| id || Pw

K2

Lid 0|| Lw || Lid ,w || Pid
Lid ,w 0|| Lw || Lid

K3

Fig. 1: The generated ciphertexts for
pair (id, w).
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The Hidden Chain of Keyword w
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encrypted
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Symbols
id w id ,w id
K
The dashed lines 2denote the hidden relationships among the generated ciphertexts. “0” in each ciphertext denote a tag bit, and its
initial value is “0”.
id ,w
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K3
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Fig. 2: The generated hidden chain relationship among ciphertexts, where
1
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2
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The Hidden Chain of File Identifier id
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2
L2id 0 || Lw || Lid , w || Pid
2

2

L1w 1|| id1 | Pw1
L2w 1|| id2 | Pw2
L3w 0|| id3 | Pw3
For each pair in DB, our scheme will generate three kinds of searchable ciphertexts, called K1, K2 and K3, respectively. The three kinds of ciphertexts areAfter Deleting The
After Searching
Keyword
w
used to accordingly achieve
functions
Search,
DeleteFile and DeleteKeyword,K3 Ciphertext
respectively. Taking pair (id, w) as an example, Figure 1 shows the generated L 1|| id | P
2
2
3
w
w
L1w 1|| id1 | Pw1
Ltheir
L3w 0|| idrelationships.
three ciphertexts, including
All K1 ciphertexts of the
w 1|| id2 | Pwhidden
3 | Pw
same keyword construct a hidden chain relationship, like the chain of keyword
w in Figure 2; all K2 ciphertexts of1 the same file identifier also construct a Lid 1|| Lw | Lid,w | Pid
hidden chain relationship, like the chain of identifier id in Figure 2; no hidden
1
relationship amongL1wK3
0|| id1 | ciphertexts
Pw1 L1id 0|| Lw || Lid ,w ||isPid needed.
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When searching a keyword with the corresponding keyword search token,
function Search finds out the hidden chain of the keyword, and follows the
guidance of the chain to rapidly find out all matching K1 ciphertexts. By decrypting these matching ciphertexts, function Search finally obtains some file
identifiers, which refer to the files containing the queried keywords. However,
our chains among K1 ciphertexts have some differences with that of KPR’12.
One difference is that we do not generate the deterministic heads for all possible
chains when initializing a DSSE scheme as KPR’12 did. On the contrary, the
head of a chain in our DSSE scheme is dynamically generated when the keyword
corresponding to the chain is the first time to be used. So we do not take extra
storage for any chain’s deterministic head.
When adding a new keyword searchable ciphertext of an existing file with
identifier id (let w0 be the new keyword), function AddKeyword generates
three above mentioned ciphertexts of pair (id, w0 ). The generated K1 ciphertext
will be linked to the end of the w0 ’s chain, and similarly the K2 ciphertext will
be linked to the end of the id’s chain. Summarily, our idea is to link the new
generated ciphertexts to the end of chains. This idea is inspired by the drawback
of KPR’12 that linking ciphertexts to the middle of chains causes some impact
on the old ciphertexts in the chains, i.e. extra information leakage. In addition,
we just need to support function AddKeyword, since function AddFile can
be achieved by executing function AddKeyword multiple times.
The biggest challenge in our work is to realize the physical deletion with small
leakage when running functions DeleteKeyword and DeleteFile. Roughly,
both functions need to delete some ciphertexts from chains. If the deletion is
physical, some operations after the deletion are necessary to repair the broken
chains. For example, suppose that the second ciphertext in the hidden chain
of keyword w in Figure 2 is physically deleted. To repair the broken chain,
values L1w and L3w must be known, and then set Pw1 = L3w . These operations
leak the fact that the ciphertexts with labels L1w and L3w are in the same chain
with the ciphertext with label L2w . In the worst case, all ciphertexts in a chain
will be leaked. To overcome this challenge, our idea is to employ both logical
and physical deletions, and run physical deletion in due course to avoid extra
information leakage. The details are as follows.
First, our K3 ciphertexts are used to support function DeleteKeyword.
When deleting all searchable ciphertexts of a file-keyword pair (id, w), a delete
token allows server to quickly find out the matching K3 ciphertext and then
decrypt out two indices. Referring to Figure 1, these two indices respectively
correspond to a K1 ciphertext and a K2 ciphertext. Then the K1 and K2 ciphertexts are logically deleted by setting their tag bits to be “1”. Finally, that
matching K3 ciphertext is physically deleted.
Second, our K2 ciphertexts are used to support function DeleteFile. When
deleting all searchable ciphertexts of a file with identifier id, a delete token allows
the server to find out the hidden chain of id. Following this chain, all matching
K2 ciphertexts can be rapidly found. Referring to Figure 1, each matching K2
ciphertext can be decrypted out two indices, and these indices allow server to
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find out all related K1 and K3 ciphertexts. Finally, all found K1 ciphertexts are
logically deleted by setting their tag bits to be “1”, and all found K2 and K3
ciphertexts are physically deleted.
Third, our above ideas show the physical deletion of K2 and K3 ciphertexts
and the logical deletion of K1 ciphertexts. Hence, our final goal is to physically
delete the K1 ciphertexts. This work is elegantly achieved when the search process is rebooted per keyword according to our extra design. Then all logically
deleted K1 ciphertexts of the queried keyword will be physically deleted, and the
corresponding chain will be repaired. Summarily, we do the physical deletion of
the K1 ciphertexts by function Search, not by function DeleteFile as previous
schemes did. This method does not cause extra information leakage, since the
inherent information leakage of function Search is enough for repairing a broken
chain which is caused by the physical deletion.

1.2

Our Contributions

Compared with KPR’12, we extend the definition of DSSE by additionally defining functions AddKeyword and DeleteKeyword. As a result, the new DSSE
definition consists of five protocols that are Setup, AddKeyword, DeleteFile,
DeleteKeyword and Search. A client runs protocol Setup to generate searchable ciphertexts, which will be stored in a server. The other Protocols allow the
client to delegate the corresponding operations to the server. We also extend the
traditional security definition, which is called indistinguishability under adaptively chosen keyword attacks (IND-CKA2). In our new security definition, a
more powerful adversary is modeled. Specifically, in either a real or an ideal attack game, an adversary is allowed to make a polynomial number of adaptive operations to engage in protocols AddKeyword, DeleteFile, DeleteKeyword
or Search.
Before proposing our complete DSSE scheme, we construct two basic DSSE
schemes to help the understanding of our ideas. The first one shows how to
construct the hidden chains among searchable ciphertexts, add new searchable
ciphertexts to the corresponding chains, and search a keyword according to the
guidance of the corresponding chain. The second one shows how to employ both
logical and physical deletions to delete all searchable ciphertexts of a file. From
these two basic DSSE schemes, we construct our complete DSSE scheme provably IND-CKA2 secure in the random oracle (RO) model. The two basic DSSE
schemes are also of independent interest in the applications in which limited
functionalities are sufficient.
We make thorough comparisons between our complete DSSE scheme and the
related KPR’12, KP’13 and CJJ’14 schemes. The comparisons show that our
scheme has noticeable advantages in all aspects of search complexity, storage
complexity, functionality and information leakage. Finally, we show the practicality of our scheme with extensive experimental results in executing its main
functions.
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1.3

Organization of The Remainder

Sections 2 and 3 respectively define some symbols, two common data structures,
DSSE and its IND-CKA2 security. Sections 4 and 5 respectively show our two
basic DSSE schemes. Section 6 proposes our complete DSSE scheme and its
provable IND-CKA2 security. In Section 7, we exactly compare our complete
DSSE scheme with some previous schemes, and then show the practice of our
scheme by numerical results. The other related works on SSE are reviewed in
Section 8. Section 9 concludes this paper.

2

Defining Symbols and Data Structures

We let symbol k ∈ N denote the security parameter. The set of all binary strings
of length n ∈ N is denoted as {0, 1}n , and the set of all finite binary strings
$

denoted as {0, 1}∗ . We write x ← X to represent an element x being sampled
uniformly at random from the set X . The output x of an algorithm A is denoted
by x ← A. |X | represents the size of set X or the total number of members in set
X . W denotes the keyword space. Each file is denoted by an unique identifier.
ID is the set of all the file identifiers. (id, w) is a file-keyword pair, where w ∈ W
and id ∈ ID. DB is a database or a set of different (id, w) pairs. |DB| is the
total number of the pairs in DB (or the size of DB). DB(w) is the set of the
file identities that pair with keyword w ∈ W in DB. Similarly, DB(id) is a set
of the keywords that pair with file id ∈ ID in DB. If pair (id, w) ∈ DB holds,
|DB(id, w)| = 1, otherwise |DB(id, w)| = 0. Symbol || denotes the concatenation
of strings.
Our schemes will employ two standard data structures List and Dictionary.
When T is a List, |T | denotes the total number of records in T . There are four
operations on dictionary D. We define them as follows:
– Creat(T ): Take a list T of label-data pairs as input (where each label is
unique), and return a dictionary D;
– Get(D, L): Take a dictionary D and a label L as inputs, return the corresponding data D if (L, D) ∈ D, otherwise return N U LL;
– Update(D, (L, D)): Take a dictionary D and a label-data pair (L, D) as
inputs, insert (L, D) into D if L does not exist in D, otherwise update the
original data of label L into the new data D, and finally return ⊥;
– Remove(D, L): Take a dictionary D and a label L as inputs, delete record
(L, D) from D and return ⊥;
Note that the dictionary algorithm Creat(T ) is history-independent [3]. It
means that for any list T the distribution of D ← Creat(T ) depends only
on the records of T not on the members’ order in T . In addition, the time
complexity of algorithm Get is O(1).
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3

Defining DSSE and Its Security

To simplify the description of our DSSE concept, we generalize several algorithms defined in KPR’12, and then add two new protocols AddKeyword and
DeleteKeyword. We also makes the following assumptions: (1) All file identifiers will never be re-used; (2) The searchable ciphertexts of the same file-keyword
T
pair will never be re-added; (3) Keyword space W and set ID have W ID = ∅.
Definition 1 (DSSE). A DSSE scheme consists of the following five protocols
between a client and a server:
– Setup: The client takes a security parameter and a database DB as inputs,
generates an initial encrypted database EDB, some secret parameters like
secret keys, and sends EDB to the server. The server stores EDB.
– AddKeyword: To add the searchable ciphertexts of a new file-keyword pair
(id, w), the client takes the file-keyword pair and his secret parameters as
inputs, generates and sends the corresponding searchable ciphertexts to the
server. The server takes the encrypted database EDB as input, and inserts
these ciphertexts into EDB.
– DeleteFile: To delete all searchable ciphertexts of a file with identifier id,
the client takes the file’s identifier and his secret parameters as inputs, generates and sends a delete token to the server. The server takes the encrypted
database EDB as input, deletes all corresponding searchable ciphertexts from
EDB.
– DeleteKeyword: To delete the searchable ciphertexts of a file-keyword pair
(id, w), the client takes the file-keyword pair and his secret parameters as
inputs, generates and sends a delete token to the server. The server takes
the encrypted database EDB as input, deletes the corresponding searchable
ciphertexts from EDB.
– Search: To find out the files containing an expected keyword w, the client
generates takes the keyword and his secret parameters as inputs, generates and sends a search token to the server. The server takes the encrypted
database EDB as input, outputs the file identifiers which means that the
corresponding files contain the keyword.
The IND-CKA2 security of a DSSE scheme defines two games: a real game
RealA between an adversary A and a challenger and an ideal game IdealA,S
between the adversary A and a simulator S. In game RealA , the challenger
sets up a real DSSE scheme, and the adversary A adaptively engages in every
protocol of DSSE by querying the challenger. On the contrary, in game IdealA,S ,
the simulator S sets up a simulated DSSE scheme. It means that S never knows
the real database DB chosen by A, and it only takes leakage functions as inputs
to simulate the functions of the challenger. If A cannot distinguish games RealA
and IdealA,S , we say that the DSSE scheme is IND-CKA2 secure. Moreover,
the smaller the leakage, the stronger the IND-CKA2 security.
Definition 2 (IND-CKA2 Security). Let DSSE = (Setup, AddKeyword,
DeleteFile, DeleteKeyword, Search) be a DSSE scheme, A be a stateful
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adversary, S be a stateful simulator, and (LSetup , LAddKeyword , LDeleteF ile ,
LDeleteKeyword , LSearch ) be stateful leakage functions. Consider the following
probabilistic experiments:
– RealA (k): A chooses DB. A challenger runs Setup to generate some secret parameters and the encrypted database EDB of DB. A receives EDB
and makes a polynomial number of adaptive operations to engage in protocol
AddKeyword, DeleteFile, DeleteKeyword or Search. For each query,
the challenger returns the corresponding result such as the searchable ciphertexts that will be added to EDB, a token to delete all searchable ciphertexts
of a file, a token to delete the searchable ciphertexts of a file-keyword pair or
a search token. Finally, A returns one bit b as the output of this experiment.
– IdealA,S (k): A chooses DB. Given LSetup , S simulates and sends EDB
to A. A makes a polynomial number of adaptive operations to engage in
protocols AddKeyword, DeleteFile, DeleteKeyword or Search. For
each query, S is with the corresponding leakage LAddKeyword , LDeleteF ile ,
LDeleteKeyword or LSearch , then returns an appropriate result such as the
searchable ciphertexts that will be added to EDB, a token to delete all searchable ciphertexts of a file, a token to delete the searchable ciphertexts of a filekeyword pair or a search token. Finally, A returns one bit b as the output of
this experiment.
If |P r[RealA (k) = 1] − P r[IdealA,S (k) = 1]| is negligible, we say that DSSE
is IND-CKA2 secure with leakage functions (LSetup , LAddKeyword , LDeleteF ile ,
LDeleteKeyword , LSearch ),.

4

Our Basic DSSE Scheme D-I

Our basic DSSE scheme D-I only consists of protocols Setup, AddKeyword
and Search. Given a database DB, protocol Setup shows the generation of
K1 ciphertexts, so that all ciphertexts of the same keyword are connected by
a hidden chain. To add the K1 ciphertext of a new file-keyword pair, protocol
AddKeyword connects the new generated ciphertext to the end of the corresponding chain. With a keyword search trapdoor, protocol Search shows how
to quickly find out the related file identifiers. Let F : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k
be a key-based pseudo-random function. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2k be a cryptographic hash functions. The basic scheme D-I is shown in Figure 3.
In protocol Setup, each keyword w has a pointer parameter Pw , and each
K1 ciphertext is a label-data pair. When generating the K1 ciphertext for a
file-keyword pair (id, w), the generated label Lw is equal to Fk1 (w) if it is the
first time to generate a ciphertext for keyword w, otherwise it is equal to Pw ,
and the data Dw is the encryption of file identifier id and a new value of Pw .
With the same method, all K1 ciphertexts of the same keyword are connected
by a hidden chain, since the value of Pw encrypted by the former one of any
two neighboring ciphertexts in a chain is equal to the label of the latter one. In
addition, the final value of Pw is privately recorded by the client at the end of
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F Protocol Setup((k, DB), N U LL):
– Client: Take k and DB as inputs, randomly choose two secret keys K =
(k1 , k2 ), initialize two empty lists TP and TW , and do the following steps:
1. For each keyword w in DB, initialize pointer parameter Pw = N U LL;
2. For each file-keyword pair (id, w) ∈ DB
(a) If Pw = N U LL, set label Lw = Fk1 (w), otherwise set Lw = Pw ;
$

Set {R, Pw } ← {0, 1}2k ;
(b) Generate a K1 ciphertext (Lw , Dw = (Dw,1 = (H(Fk2 (w), R) ⊕
(id||Pw )), Dw,2 = R)), and add this ciphertext to TW in the lexicon
order;
3. For each keyword w in DB, add tuple (w, Pw ) into TP ; Generate dictionaries DP ← Creat(TP ) and DW ← Creat(TW ); Keep K and DP
secret, and send the encrypted database EDB = DW to the server;
– Server: Store EDB.
F Protocol AddKeyword((K, DP , id, w), EDB):
– Client: Take K = (k1 , k2 ), DP and a file-keyword pair (id, w) as inputs,
retrieve Pw ← Get(DP , w) according to w, and do the following steps:
1. If Pw = N U LL, set Lw = Fk1 (w), otherwise set Lw = Pw ; Set
$

{R, Pw } ← {0, 1}2k ;
2. Generate a K1 ciphertext (Lw , Dw = (Dw,1 = (H(Fk2 (w), R) ⊕
(id||Pw )), Dw,2 = R)), run algorithm Update(DP , (w, Pw )), and send
the ciphertext (Lw , Dw ) to the server;
– Server: Take EDB = DW and (Lw , Dw ) as inputs, and run algorithm
Update(DW , (Lw , Dw )).
F Protocol Search((K, w), EDB):
– Client: Take K = (k1 , k2 ) and a keyword w as inputs, generate and send a
search token STw = (Fk1 (w), Fk2 (w)) to the server;
– Server: Take EDB = DW and STw = (Fk1 (w), Fk2 (w)) as inputs, initialize
an empty set I , set Lw = Fk1 (w), and do the following steps:
1. Retrieve data Dw ← Get(DW , Lw ) according to Lw ; If Dw = N U LL,
return I and abort;
2. Parse Dw = (Dw,1 , Dw,2 ), and decrypt out id||Pw = Dw,1 ⊕
H(Fk2 (w), Dw,2 );
3. Add id to I , set Lw = Pw , and go to step 1).

Fig. 3: Our basic DSSE scheme D-I.
protocol Setup. This value will be used in protocol AddKeyword to generate
a new K1 ciphertext of keyword w. Specifically, this value is taken as the label of
this new ciphertext. Hence, it can be connected to the end of the corresponding
chain.
When receiving a keyword search trapdoor STw = (Fk1 (w), Fk2 (w)), protocol
Search matches value Fk1 (w) with all K1 ciphertexts’ labels to find out the
hidden chain head of keyword w, and applies value Fk2 (w) to decrypting out a file
identifier and a pointer value. The file identifier corresponds to a file containing
the queried keyword, and the pointer value guides the server to find out the next
matching ciphertext. So on and so forth, all file identifiers related to the queried
keyword can be found.

5

Our Basic DSSE Scheme D-II

Our basic DSSE scheme D-II only consists of protocols Setup, DeleteFile and
Search. Given a database DB, protocol Setup applies the same idea as the first
basic DSSE scheme to generating the K1 and K2 ciphertexts. And it generates
the hidden chains respectively to connect all K1 ciphertexts of the same keyword

10
F Protocol Setup((k, DB), N U LL):
– Client: Take k and DB as inputs, randomly choose two k-bit secret keys
K = (k1 , k2 ), initialize two empty lists TW and TF , and do the following
steps:
1. For each file identifier id or keyword w in DB, initialize pointer parameter Pid = N U LL or Pw = N U LL;
2. For each file-keyword pair (id, w) ∈ DB
(a) If Pw = N U LL, set label Lw = Fk1 (w), otherwise set Lw = Pw ;
$

Set {R, Pw } ← {0, 1}2k ;
(b) Generate a K1 ciphertext (Lw , Dw = (Dw,1 = (H(Fk2 (w), R) ⊕
(0||id||Pw )), Dw,2 = R)), and add this ciphertext into TW in the
lexicon order;
(c) If Pid = N U LL, set label Lid = Fk1 (id), otherwise set Lid = Pid ;
$

Set {R, Pid } ← {0, 1}2k ;
(d) Generate a K2 ciphertext (Lid , Did = (Did,1 = (G(Fk2 (id), R) ⊕
(Lw ||Pid )), Did,2 = R)), and add this ciphertext to TF in the lexicon
order;
3. Generate dictionaries DW ← Creat(TW ) and DF ← Creat(TF );
4. Keep the privacy of K, and send the encrypted database EDB =
(DW , DF ) to the server;
– Server: Store EDB.
F Protocol DeleteFile((K, id), EDB):
– Client: Take K = (k1 , k2 ) and a file identifier id as inputs, generate and
send a delete token DTid = (Fk1 (id), Fk2 (id)) to the server.
– Server: Take EDB = (DW , DF ) and DTid = (Fk1 (id), Fk2 (id)) as inputs,
set Lid = Fk1 (id), and do the following steps:
1. Retrieve data Did ← Get(DF , Lid ) according to Lid ; If Did = N U LL,
return ⊥ and abort;
2. Parse Did
=
(Did,1 , Did,2 ), decrypt out Lw ||Pid
=
Did,1 ⊕
G(Fk2 (id), Did,2 ), and run algorithm Remove(DF , Lid );
3. Retrieve data Dw ← Get(DW , Lw ) according to the decrypted Lw ,
parse Dw = (Dw,1 , Dw,2 ), set the tag bit of Dw to be “1” by computing Dw,1 = Dw,1 ⊕ (1||02k ), run algorithms Update(DW , (Lw , Dw =
(Dw,1 , Dw,2 ))) and Remove(DF , Lid ), and set Lid = Pid , and go to
step 1).
F Protocol Search((K, w), EDB):
– Client: Take K = (k1 , k2 ) and a keyword w as inputs, generate and send a
search token STw = (Fk1 (w), Fk2 (w)) to the server.
– Server: Take EDB = (DW , DF ) and STw = (Fk1 (w), Fk2 (w)) as inputs,
t
=
initialize an empty set I , a temporary label-data pair (Ltw = N U LL, Dw
t
N U LL) and a temporary pointer Pw
= N U LL, set Lw = Fk1 (w), and do
the following steps:
1. Retrieve data Dw ← Get(DW , Lw ) according to Lw ; If Dw = N U LL,
return I and abort;
2. Parse Dw = (Dw,1 , Dw,2 ), and decrypt out T ||id||Pw = Dw,1 ⊕
H(Fk2 (w), Dw,2 ), where T denotes the tag bit of Dw ;
t
t
3. If Ltw = N U LL, set Ltw = Lw , Dw
= D w , Pw
= Pw and Lw = Pw , and
go to step 1);
t
t
t
t
t
t
), update Dw,1
= Dw,1
⊕ (0k+1 ||(Pw
⊕
4. If T = 1, parse Dw
= (Dw,1
, Dw,2
t
t
t
Pw )), and run algorithms Update(DW , (Ltw , Dw
= (Dw,1
, Dw,2
))) and
Remove(DW , Lw );
5. If T = 0, add the decrypted file identifier id to I , and set Ltw = Lw ,
t
t
Dw
= Dw and Pw
= Pw ;
6. Set Lw = Pw , and go to step 1).

Fig. 4: Our basic DSSE scheme D-II.

and all K2 ciphertexts of the same file identifier. It is worth noting that each
K1 ciphertext in this scheme contains a tag bit with the initial value “0”. When
a tag bit is equal to “1”, it means that the corresponding K1 ciphertext is
logically deleted. To delete all searchable ciphertexts (including the K1 and K2
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ciphertexts) of a file, protocol DeleteFile shows the physical deletion of all
related K2 ciphertexts and the logical deletion of all related K1 ciphertexts. With
a keyword search trapdoor, protocol Search not only shows how to quickly find
out the related file identifiers as the first basic DSSE scheme does, but also shows
how to physically delete the K1 ciphertexts that contain the queried keyword
and have their tag bits equaling to “1”. Let F : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k
be a key-based pseudo-random function. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2k+1 and G :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2k be two cryptographic hash functions. The basic scheme D-II
is shown in Figure 4.
In protocol DeleteFile, a delete token DTid = (Fk1 (id), Fk2 (id)) allows the
server to match value Fk1 (id) with all K2 ciphertexts’ labels and find out a
matching ciphertext. Then the server applies value Fk2 (id) to decrypting the
matching ciphertext and gets a label Lw and a pointer Pid . The label Lw corresponds to a K1 ciphertext of id, and the server sets the tag bit of the K1
ciphertext to be “1”. In addition, the pointer Pid guides the server to quickly
find out the next matching K2 ciphertext. So on and so forth, all K1 and K2
ciphertexts of id can be found, and the server physically deletes the found K2
ciphertexts and logically deletes the found K1 ciphertexts. The logically deleted
K1 ciphertexts will be physically deleted by protocol Search. When searching
a keyword, protocol Search can quickly find out all matching K1 ciphertexts
as the first basic DSSE scheme does. If the tag bit of a matching K1 ciphertext is equal to “1”, the server physically deletes this ciphertext, and repairs the
corresponding chain relationship among the remaining K1 ciphertexts.

6

Our Complete DSSE Scheme

The above two basic DSSE schemes respectively show our following main ideas:
(1) Constructing the hidden chains to connect all searchable ciphertexts of the
same keyword to accelerate the search performance; (2) Saving the storage complexity by dynamically generating chain heads; (3) Adding the new generated
searchable ciphertext at the end of the corresponding chain; (4) Employing both
logical and physical deletions to delete the expected searchable ciphertexts, specially, running physical deletion in due course.
Note that the above last two main ideas are used to avoid extra information
leakage. In this section, we extend the above two basic schemes to construct
our complete DSSE scheme. It consists of protocols Setup, AddKeyword,
DeleteFile, DeleteKeyword and Search. Since DeleteKeyword is newly
achieved by this scheme, it makes other protocols having some differences compared with the above two basic DSSE schemes. But this scheme has exactly the
same protocol Search as the basic scheme D-II. Hence, this protocol will not be
shown in this section. Let F : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k be a key-based pseudorandom function. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2k+1 and G : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}3k+1
be two cryptographic hash functions. Our complete DSSE scheme is shown in
Figures 5 and 6.
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F Protocol Setup((k, DB), N U LL):
– Client: Take a security parameter k and a database DB as inputs, randomly
choose two k-bit secret keys K = (k1 , k2 ), initialize four empty lists TP , TW ,
TF and TF,W , and do the following steps:
1. For each file identifier id or keyword w in DB, initialize pointer parameter Pid = N U LL or Pw = N U LL;
2. For each keyword w in DB and each id ∈ DB(w)
(a) If Pw = N U LL, set label Lw = Fk1 (w), otherwise set Lw = Pw ;
$

Set {R, Pw } ← {0, 1}2k ;
(b) Generate a K1 ciphertext (Lw , Dw = (Dw,1 = (H(Fk2 (w), R) ⊕
(0||id||Pw )), Dw,2 = R)), and add this ciphertext to TW in the
lexicon order; Set label Lid,w = Fk1 (id, w);
(c) If Pid = N U LL, set label Lid = Fk1 (id), otherwise set Lid = Pid ;
$

Set {R, Pid } ← {0, 1}2k ;
(d) Generate a K2 ciphertext (Lid , Did = (Did,1 = (G(Fk2 (id), R) ⊕
(0||Lw ||Lid,w ||Pid )), Did,2 = R)), and add this ciphertext to TF in
$

the lexicon order; Set R ← {0, 1}k ;
(e) Generate a K3 ciphertext (Lid,w , Did,w
=
(Did,w,1
=
(H(Fk2 (id, w), R) ⊕ (0||Lw ||Lid )), Did,w,2 = R)), and add this ciphertext to TF,W in the lexicon order;
3. For each keyword w in DB, add tuple (w, Pw ) to TP ; For each file
identifier id in DB, add tuple (id, Pid ) to TP ; Generate dictionaries DP ← Creat(TP ), DW ← Creat(TW ), DF ← Creat(TF ) and
DF,W ← Creat(TF,W );
4. Keep K and DP secret, and send the encrypted database EDB =
(DW , DF , DF,W ) to the server;
– Server: Store EDB.
F Protocol AddKeyword((K, DP , id, w), EDB):
– Client: Take K = (k1 , k2 ), DP and a file-keyword pair (id, w) as inputs,
retrieve Pw ← Get(DP , w) according to w, and do the following steps:
1. If Pw = N U LL, set label Lw = Fk1 (w), otherwise set Lw = Pw ; Set
$

{R, Pw } ← {0, 1}2k ;
2. Generate a K1 ciphertext (Lw , Dw = (Dw,1 = (H(Fk2 (w), R) ⊕
(0||id||Pw )), Dw,2 = R)), and run algorithm Update(DP , (w, Pw )); Set
label Lid,w = Fk1 (id, w); Retrieve Pid ← Get(DP , id) according to id;
3. If Pid = N U LL, set label Lid = Fk1 (id), otherwise set Lid = Pid ; Set
$

{R, Pid } ← {0, 1}2k ;
4. Generate a K2 ciphertext (Lid , Did = (Did,1 = (G(Fk2 (id), R) ⊕
(0||Lw ||Lid,w ||Pid )), Did,2
=
R)),
and
run
algorithm
$

Update(DP , (id, Pid )); Set R ← {0, 1}k ;
5. Generate
a
K3
ciphertext
(Lid,w , Did,w
=
(Did,w,1
=
(H(Fk2 (id, w), R) ⊕ (0||Lw ||Lid )), Did,w,2 = R));
6. Send ciphertexts (Lw , Dw , Lid , Did , Lid,w , Did,w ) to the server;
– Server: Take EDB = (DW , DF , DF,W ) and (Lw , Dw , Lid , Did , Lid,w , Did,w )
as
inputs,
run
algorithms
Update(DW , (Lw , Dw )),
Update(DF , (Lid , Did )) and Update( DF,W , (Lid,w , Did,w )).

Fig. 5: Our complete DSSE scheme (Part I).

In this scheme, protocol Setup newly achieves generation of the K3 ciphertexts. In other words, protocol Setup generates three kinds of searchable ciphertexts, i.e. K1, K2 and K3, for each file-keyword pair (id, w). Figure 1 shows the
generated K1, K2 and K3 ciphertexts of a file-keyword pair, and their hidden
relationship.
The K3 ciphertexts are used to realize protocol DeleteKeyword. When
deleting all searchable ciphertexts of a file-keyword pair (id, w), the generated
delete token DTid,w = (Fk1 (id, w), Fk2 (id, w)) of protocol DeleteKeyword
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F Protocol DeleteFile((K, id), EDB):
– Client: Take K = (k1 , k2 ) and a file identifier id as inputs, generate and
send a delete token DTid = (Fk1 (id), Fk2 (id)) to the server.
– Server: Take EDB = (DW , DF , DF,W ) and DTid = (Fk1 (id), Fk2 (id)) as
inputs, set label Lid = Fk1 (id), and do the following steps:
1. Retrieve data Did ← Get(DF , Lid ) according to Lid ; If Did = N U LL,
return ⊥ and abort;
2. Parse Did = (Did,1 , Did,2 ), and decrypt out T ||Lw ||Lid,w ||Pid = Did,1 ⊕
G(Fk2 (id), Did,2 ), and run algorithm Remove(DF , Lid ), where T denotes the tag bit of Did ;
3. If T = 0, retrieve Dw ← Get(DW , Lw ) according to the decrypted Lw ,
parse Dw = (Dw,1 , Dw,2 ), set the tag bit of Dw to be “1” by computing Dw,1 = Dw,1 ⊕ (1||02k ), run algorithms Update(DW , (Lw , Dw =
(Dw,1 , Dw,2 ))) and Remove(DF,W , Lid,w ); Set Lid = Pid , and go to
step 1).
F Protocol DeleteKeyword((K, id, w), EDB):
– Client: Take secret keys K = (k1 , k2 ) and a file-keyword pair (id, w) as
inputs, generate and send a delete token DTid,w = (Fk1 (id, w), Fk2 (id, w))
to the server;
– Server:
Take
EDB
=
(DW , DF , DF,W )
and
DTid,w
=
(Fk1 (id, w), Fk2 (id, w)) as inputs, set Lid,w = Fk1 (id, w) and do the
following steps:
1. Retrieve data Did,w ← Get(DF,W , Lid,w ) according to Lid,w ; If
Did,w = N U LL, return ⊥ and abort;
2. Parse Did,w = (Did,w,1 , Did,w,2 ), decrypt out T ||Lw ||Lid = Did,w,1 ⊕
H(Fk2 (id, w), Did,w,2 ), and run algorithm Remove(DF,W , Lid,w );
3. Retrieve data Dw ← Get(DW , Lw ) according to the decrypted
label Lw , parse Dw = (Dw,1 , Dw,2 ), set the tag bit of Dw to
be “1” by computing Dw,1 = Dw,1 ⊕ 1||02k , and run algorithm
Update(DW , (Lw , Dw = (Dw,1 , Dw,2 )));
4. Retrieve data Did ← Get(DF , Lid ) according to the decrypted label Lid , parse Did = (Did,1 , Did,2 ), set the tag bit of Dw to
be “1” by computing Did,1 = Did,1 ⊕ 1||03k , and run algorithm
Update(DF , (Lid , Did = (Did,1 , Did,2 ))).
F Protocol Search((K, w), EDB) is same as the basic scheme D-II.

Fig. 6: Our complete DSSE scheme (Part II).

allows the server to find out the matching K3 ciphertext by matching value
Fk1 (id, w) with all K3 ciphertexts’ labels, and then the server applies value
Fk2 (id, w) to decrypting the matching K3 ciphertext, and gets labels Lw and
Lid . These two labels respectively correspond to the K1 and K2 ciphertexts of
the file-keyword pair (id, w). Finally, the server physically deletes the matching
K3 ciphertext, and logically deletes the corresponding K1 and K2 ciphertexts by
setting their tag bits to be “1”.
It is different with the second basic DSSE scheme that some K2 ciphertexts
could have been logically deleted before the execution of protocol DeleteFile.
Hence, protocol DeleteFile in this scheme has two ways to delete K2 ciphertexts. For example, suppose to delete the K2 ciphertext of label Lid in protocol
DeleteFile, the sever decrypts this ciphertext to obtain a tag bit and two labels
Lw and Lid,w . If the tag bit is equal to “0”, the server finds out the corresponding
K1 and K3 ciphertexts according to those two labels, then physically deletes the
K2 and K3 ciphertexts and logically deletes the K1 ciphertext. Otherwise, the
server only physically deletes the k2 ciphertext, since the corresponding K1 and
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K3 ciphertexts have been logically or physically deleted by a previous execution
of protocol DeleteKeyword.
In addition, protocol AddKeyword has the same essence with protocol
Setup to generate searchable ciphertexts. But protocol AddKeyword takes
only one file-keyword pair as input. Contrarily, protocol Setup takes a lot of
file-keyword pairs as inputs.
Summarily, our complete DSSE scheme shows all of our main ideas that
were introduced in Subsection 1.1. The most contributive and novel work in
our scheme should be the hybrid of logical and physical deletion of searchable
ciphertexts, so that the deletion function only causes small information leakage
compared with schemes KPR’12, KP’13 and CJJ’14.
6.1

Provable IND-CKA2 Security

According to the IND-CKA2 security definition, the security proof of our complete DSSE scheme requires us to construct a simulator S. This simulator only
takes leakage functions as inputs, and simulates our scheme by responding the
following requirements of adversary A. When A chooses a database DB to engage in protocol Setup, S takes leakage function LSetup as input, and simulates an encrypted database EDB. When A chooses a new file-keyword pair
to engage in protocol AddKeyword, S takes leakage function LAddKeyword as
input, and simulates the corresponding searchable ciphertexts. When A chooses
a file to engage in protocol DeleteFile, S takes leakage function LDeleteF ile as
input, and simulates the corresponding delete token. When A chooses an old filekeyword pair to engage in protocol DeleteKeyword, S takes leakage function
LDeleteKeyword as input, and simulates the corresponding delete token. When
A chooses a keyword to engage in protocol Search, S takes leakage function
LSearch as input, and simulates the corresponding search token.
All the above simulated data will be sent to A. Moreover they must be indistinguishable with real ones in the view of A. To meet the above requirements,
we have to assume that the hash functions and the pseudo-random function in
our scheme are random oracles. S controls the responses of these oracles, and
makes the above forgeries indistinguishable with the real ones in the view of A.
We define the leakage functions for all proposed protocols. When defining
the leakage functions, the most complex work is to define the leakage caused by
the linkage of some protocols’ instances. In this paper, we apply a new idea to
define the leakage functions. This idea makes the definitions more clear. For all
ciphertexts generated by protocol Setup, let Old(id, w) denote the set of ciphertexts that were generated for file-keyword pair (id, w), let Old(id) denote the set
of ciphertexts that were generated for file id, and let Old(w) denote the set of
ciphertexts that were generated for keyword w. For all ciphertexts generated by
protocol AddKeyword, let N ew(id, w) denote the set of ciphertexts that were
generated for file-keyword pair (id, w), let N ew(id) denote the set of ciphertexts
that were generated for file id, and let N ew(w) denote the set of ciphertexts
that were generated for keyword w. The leakage functions are LSetup = |DB|,
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LAddKeyword = N ew(id, w), LDeleteF ile = (Old(id), N ew(id)), LDeleteKeyword =
(Old(id, w), N ew(id, w)) and LSearch = (DB(w), Old(w), N ew(w)) respectively.
It is clear that most of above leakage functions are defined as the set of
some related ciphertexts. This method is easy to imply the leakage caused by
the linkage of some protocols’ instances. For example, when running protocol
AddKeyword to add a file-keyword pair (id, w), one can decide that whether
keyword w has been searched by a previous instance of protocol Search. This
leakage is contained in our definitions. In other words, if the leakage LAddKeyword =
N ew(id, w) of an instance of protocol AddKeyword has some common ciphertexts with the leakage LSearch = (DB(w), Old(w), N ew(w)) of an instance
of protocol Search, it means that keyword w has been searched by the latter instance. In addition, this example also allows one to decide that whether
file-keyword pair (id, w) has been deleted by a previous instance of protocol
DeleteFile or DeleteKeyword. This leakage is also contained in our definitions by the similar reason. In general, given two instances of our proposed protocols, the leakage caused by their linkage is implied in our definitions. Finally,
we have Theorem 1 whose proof can be found in the full version.
Theorem 1. Suppose hash functions H and G and key-based pseudo-random
function Fk1 are respectively modeled as three random oracles. Our complete
DSSE scheme is IND-CKA2 secure with leakage functions (LSetup , LAddKeyword ,
LDeleteF ile , LDeleteKeyword , LSearch ) in the RO model, where LSetup = |DB|,
LAddKeyword = N ew(id, w), LDeleteF ile = (Old(id), N ew(id)), LDeleteKeyword =
(Old(id, w), N ew(id, w)) and LSearch = (DB(w), Old(w), N ew(w))}.

7

Comparisons and Experiments

Table 2: Exact comparisons.
Search
Storage
Leakage Functions
Complexity
Complexity
LSetup LSearch LAddKeyword LDeleteF ile
LDeleteKeyword
1
3
KPR’12[1]
O(|DB(w)|)
O(|DB| + |W|) |W|, |DB|
×
×
1
4
KP’13[2] O(|DB(w)| · log |ID|) O(|W| · |ID|) |W| · |ID|
×
×
1
2
5 at the worst case
CJJ’14[3]
O(|DB(w)|)
O(|DB|)
|DB|
×
1
2
4
5
Ours
O(|DB(w)|)
O(|DB|)
|DB|
1 : DB(w), Old(w) and N ew(w). 2 : N ew(id, w). 3 : Old(id), N ew(id) and a part of DB(w) where w ∈ DB(id).
4 : Old(id) and N ew(id). 5 : Old(id, w) and N ew(id, w). ×: means that the operation cannot be achieved.
All symbols have been defined in Section 2 and Subsection 6.1.
Scheme

In this section, we make thorough comparisons between our complete DSSE
scheme and the related schemes KPR’12, KP’13 and CJJ’14 in Table 2. We also
conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the performance of our scheme. Table
2 shows the following advantages of our scheme: (1) the lowest search complexity,
which is linear with the total number of files containing the queried keyword; (2)
the lowest storage complexity, which is linear with the size of database DB (or
the total number of file-keyword pairs in database DB); (3) the smallest leakage
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to run protocol Setup, which only contains the size of database DB; (4) the same
leakage with schemes KPR’12, KP’13 and CJJ’14 to run protocol Search; (5) the
same leakage with scheme CJJ’14 to run protocol AddKeyword; (6) the smaller
leakage to run protocol DeleteFile than that of KPR’12; (7) the same leakage
(at the worst case) with scheme CJJ’14 to run protocol DeleteKeyword. Hence,
our DSSE scheme not only supports all functions mentioned in Table 1, but also
has the lowest search and storage complexities, and the smallest leakages in most
cases.
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Fig. 7: All tests and their results.

We coded our complete DSSE scheme and tested its performance on a simulated database DB of millions file-keyword pairs. The inputted security parameter is of binary size 80 bits. All hash functions and pseudo-random function are
implemented by running hash function SHA-256. The practical implementation
of a DSSE scheme consists of two kinds of time-intensive operations: cryptographic computations and system actions (e.g., network transmission and file
system access). To separate cryptographic costs from system costs, we built a
test framework excluding network transmission and disk access. In other words,
all data are stored in memory. Most of tests were implemented in a PC with
Intel CPU 2.4 GHz (Core i5) and Ubuntu system by a single thread. Only the
final test is a parallel search with a 4-core processor.
To simulate a database DB with millions file-keyword pairs, we chose 200
commonly used keywords from Google Search Engine. We supposed that each file
has no more than 20 keywords, and each file identifier was randomly generated.
We paired each keyword with some file identifiers according to this keyword’s
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frequency. Finally, all simulated file-keyword pairs were collected in a database
DB.
Figure 7(a) shows the time cost of our complete DSSE scheme to generate
an encrypted database EDB for the above simulated database DB, where |DB|
is between 106 and 107 . This process contains generating searchable ciphertexts
and constructing a self-balancing binary search tree (or AVL tree) for these
ciphertexts. For example, the time cost to encrypt DB with size 107 is about
241 seconds. From this experiment result, we can find that the time cost per filekeyword pair is an amortized value: it was determined by taking the complete
execution time of experiment and dividing by the number of file-keyword pairs.
Figure 7(b) shows the time cost of our complete DSSE scheme to search each
keyword over different scaled DBs. Recall that our protocol Search includes
the process to physically delete the K1 ciphertexts with the tag bit equaling
“1”. We show this process in Figure 7(e). In Figure 7(b), the line with triangles
shows the time costs when |DB| = 106 , the line with circles shows the time costs
when |DB| = 5 × 106 , and the line with rectangles shows the time costs when
|DB| = 107 .
Figure 7(c) shows the time cost of our complete DSSE scheme to add the
searchable ciphertexts of several file-keyword pairs. This process excludes the
generation of searchable ciphertexts, since this part is similar with the process
to encrypt a database. So it only contains the process to rebalance the AVL tree
according to these new added ciphertexts. We have a group of experiments to
add the searchable ciphertexts of the different number (between 105 and 106 ) of
pairs to a database with the original size |DB| = 3 × 106 .
Figure 7(d) shows the time cost of our complete DSSE scheme to delete
the searchable ciphertexts of several file-keyword pairs. We have a group of
experiments to delete the searchable ciphertexts of different number (between
105 and 106 ) of pairs from a database with the original size |DB| = 107 .
Figure 7(e) shows the time cost of physical deletion when one searches a
keyword in our complete DSSE scheme. Recall that all K1 ciphertexts of the same
keyword are applied to construction of the hidden chain relationship. Suppose
some of them have the tag bit equaling “1”. These ciphertexts will be physically
deleted when their associated keywords are searching. This process contains to
repair a broken chain and rebalance the original AVL tree of the searchable
ciphertexts. For different number (between 104 and 5 × 104 ) of ciphertexts with
the tag bit equaling “1”, we tested the time cost to physically delete them from
a database with the original size |DB| = 107 .
Both in Figures 7(d) and 7(e), some singular points indicate that the time
cost is not strictly linear with the number of deleted ciphertexts. These singular
points are caused by the operations to rebalance the AVL tree of searchable
ciphertexts. Comparatively, when different nodes are deleted in an AVL tree,
the time costs to rebalance the AVL tree are also different.
Finally, Figure 7(f) shows the time cost of parallel search in our complete
DSSE scheme. We simulated four databases with the same number of file-keyword
pairs, and generated their encrypted databases. The total size of all databases is
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|DB| = 4 × 106 . The line with circles shows the time cost to search each keyword
in parallel with a 4-core processor, and the line with rectangles shows the time
cost to search each keyword in the serial mode.

8

Other Related Works

SSE was first introduced by Song et al. in [5]. Their instantiated scheme takes
search time linear with the total binary size of ciphertexts. A number of efforts
[6,7,8] follow this line and refine Song et al.’s original work, where [8] is the first
one to construct indices for ciphertexts. The SSE scheme due to Curtmola et al.
[9] has been proven to be semantically secure against an adaptive adversary. It
allows search to be processed in logarithmic time, although the keyword search
token has length linear with the total number of ciphertexts in the worst case.
In addition to the above efforts devoted to either provable security or better
search performance, attention has recently been paid to achieve versatile SSE
schemes. Waters et al. [10] showed practical applications of SSE and employed
it to realize secure and searchable audit logs. Several works in SSE are complex queries for conjunctive [11,12] or disjunctive [13,14] keyword combinations.
The works in [9,15] extended SSE to a multi-sender scenario. Recent results
[16,17] achieved efficiency improvements for these complex queries. The works
in [18,19] supported fuzzy keyword searching. The schemes in [20,21,22,23] solved
the problem of multi-keyword ranked search and multi-dimensional range query
over encrypted cloud data. Lu [24] improved the search performance of range
queries by constructing indices. Boldyreva et al. [25] first studied symmetric encryption primitive with order preserving and provided an instance with provable
security. Chase et al. [26] first studied the searchable symmetric encryption of
structured data.
In addition to the previously introduced DSSE schemes in [1,2,3], Naveed et
al. [27] proposed a DSSE scheme to trade storage for performance by scattering
the stored blocks using hashing instead of encrypting the indices. This work
leaks keyword frequency like [1]. Emilet et al. [4] proposed a hierarchical index
structure using oblivious random access memory (RAM) to achieve more secure
and effective dynamic ciphertext updates with small leakage. This work is not
efficient in practice because of a large number of communication rounds and
expensive storage costs on the server side [28]. Hahn et al. [29] constructed
visible relationships to group all searchable ciphertexts of the same keyword,
when keywords are at the first time to be searched. According to those groups,
the performance to repeatedly search the same keyword will be significantly
improved. This method can also be applied in KPR’12, KP’13 and CJJ’14 to
accelerate their performance to repeatedly search the same keyword. But the
first-time search performance per keyword of [29] is linear with the total number
of ciphertexts. Hence, its search complexity is the highest one comparably.
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Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed a new DSSE scheme to simultaneously support fast
keyword search, low storage complexity, versatile functions and small leakage
when implementing these functions. Our scheme has the search complexity linear
with the number of searchable ciphertexts containing the queried keyword, and
has the storage complexity linear with the size of original database. Compared
with previous works, our scheme has the most versatile functions. In addition to
search a keyword, it allows a client to (1) add the searchable ciphertexts of a new
file-keyword pair, (2) delete the searchable ciphertexts of a file, and (3) delete
the searchable ciphertexts of a file-keyword pair. In most cases, our scheme has
the smallest leakage compared with previous works. Furthermore, our scheme is
proven IND-CKA2 secure, which excludes possible vulnerabilities in design. The
most contributive and novel work in our scheme is to achieve physical deletion
with small leakage.
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